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THE PEOPLE V. THEIR LEGISLATURE:  
PROPOSING THE USE OF RULE 24 AS A 
TOOL TO REGULATE THE “TYRANNY OF 
THE MAJORITY” AND ENSURE THE “TRUE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE” IS UPHELD 
ADAM SCOTTO† 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 4, 2008, California voters made a landmark 
decision that would shake the foundation of minority rights in 
America by voting “yes” on Proposition 8.1  Proposition 8 was a 
ballot initiative, sponsored by a group called Protect Marriage, 
that amended the state’s constitution to ban same-sex marriage.2  
Gay marriage proponents responded by filing lawsuits against 
the State of California and other state governing bodies and 
officials, challenging the initiative on the grounds that 
Proposition 8 should not have been allowed on the ballot because 
it was a constitutional revision rather than an amendment.3  The 
California Supreme Court upheld the ballot initiative against the 
challenge to its conformity with the state constitution.4  Shortly 
after the California Supreme Court’s decision, gay marriage 




† St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s University School of 
Law; B.A., 2008, Queens College. I would like to thank Professor Sovern for 
providing me with invaluable advice throughout the process. I would also like to 
thank Bridget for always believing in me, and my mother, Roberta, who made all of 
this possible.   
1 Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Ban in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1. 
2 Id. 
3 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009). In California, the state 
constitution can be amended through the ballot initiative process but cannot be 
revised. Id. A revision is distinct from an amendment because it represents more of 
an overhaul of the constitution than an amendment does. See id. at 61. 
4 Id. at 119. 
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officials whose duty it was to implement the law, alleging that 
the law violates the U.S. Constitution’s due process and equal 
protection guarantees.5  That case is still in the appeals process.   
Presumably, most state officials did not actively support 
Proposition 8, or they would have proposed such an amendment 
themselves.6  In addition, the California Supreme Court had 
ruled in favor of allowing gay marriage just one year earlier.7  
Many of the groups that were involved in sponsoring the 
initiative felt like they would be in a position to defend the law 
more vigorously than the seemingly adversely interested state 
officials and moved to intervene in the federal and state suits in 
defense of the law.8  In both cases, given California’s liberal 
intervention allowance rules,9 the sponsoring groups were 
allowed to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the law.10  
This was especially pertinent in the ongoing federal court case, 
as state officials had decided not to defend the measure at all.11  
This Note considers the outcome in a case where named 
state official defendants in a similar claim decline to defend the 
suit, and the sponsors of the initiative are not allowed to 
intervene.  Federal courts are split on the issue of whether to 
allow intervention as a matter of right to a ballot sponsor under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (“Rule 24”), the rule governing 
 
5 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
6 Amendments to the California state constitution must be voted on by the 
public but can be put on the ballot by a two-thirds legislative vote. CAL. CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 1. Not only did the legislature not propose such an amendment here but the 
California State Senate approved a non-binding resolution calling on the California 
Supreme Court to overturn Proposition 8. See Patrick McGreevy, Senate Censures 
Gay-Marriage Ban, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A5. Governor Schwarzenegger was 
an outspoken opponent of Proposition 8 as well. See Michael Rothfield & Tony 
Barboza, Governor Backs Gay Marriage; Schwarzenegger Voices Hope that 
Proposition 8 Will Be Overturned by Courts as Crowds Continue To Protest, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at B1. 
7 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). 
8 See Proposed Intervenors’ Notice of Motion & Motion To Intervene & 
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion To Intervene at 1, Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-2292), 2009 WL 
1499309 [hereinfacter Motion to Intervene]; Strauss, 207 P.3d at 69. 
9 Intervention in California is governed by section 387 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure, which reads almost identically to Rule 24. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 387(b) (West 2009), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). The Ninth Circuit, however, 
has liberally allowed intervention in similar situations. See Motion To Intervene, 
supra note 8, at 6; infra Part II.A.1. 
10 See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; Strauss, 207 P.3d at 69. 
11 See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; Maura Dolan, Gov. Won’t Defend 
Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4. 
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intervention.12  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has generally 
allowed such sponsors to intervene.13  On the other hand, the 
Sixth Circuit recently denied the proposed intervention of the 
sponsor of an anti-affirmative action law in a case challenging 
the constitutionality of the law,14 where similar concerns existed 
about the named defendants’ desire to uphold the law.15  This 
Note argues that allowing intervention as a matter of right to 
sponsors of ballot initiatives to allow them, rather than the 
named defendants, to defend the constitutionality of the passed 
law is at odds with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well 
as public policy and that disallowing such intervention will have 
a prodigious effect on the rights of all. 
Part I provides background on the ballot initiative process 
and its usage throughout American history, as well as an in-
depth analysis of the requirements of Rule 24.  Part II discusses 
the conflicting decisions of the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, as well as the current political controversy surrounding 
ballot initiatives.  Part III argues that, because of the overall 
inadequacy of modern ballot initiatives in capturing the “will of 
the people,” and because of the general failure of sponsors to 
meet the requirements of Rule 24, an application for intervention 
by an initiative’s sponsor should never be granted.  Part III 
ultimately concludes that a suit brought by any party challenging 
the constitutionality of a passed ballot initiative should be used 
by the state as a “second-check” on whether the initiative ably 
communicates the will of the public on that topic. 
I. BACKGROUND: BALLOT INITIATIVES AND RULE 24 
This Part explains the complexities of both ballot initiatives 
and Rule 24.  First, it will give the reader an idea of what ballot 
initiatives and sponsors are, how they originated, and the context 
that we see them in now.  Then, it will give a general overview of 
Rule 24.  Finally, it will explain the three main requirements of 
 
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
13 See, e.g., Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 
627, 629–30 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
14 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 777, 784 (6th 
Cir. 2007). 
15 Id. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Rule 24 to provide the framework upon which petitioning 
sponsors’ motions for intervention are analyzed. 
A. History of Ballot Initiatives in America 
A ballot initiative is a proposed law that requires voter 
approval for enactment.16  An initiative can reach the ballot and 
be voted on by the public only after collection of a set number of 
signatures of eligible voters.17  The person or group that starts 
the initiative process and submits the signatures to the state is 
called the sponsor of that initiative.  
The initiative process, which is sometimes referred to as 
“direct democracy,” originated in the late 1800s as progressives 
looked to shake up the “party machine politics” that had 
corrupted state and federal legislation.18  The idea was to take 
some representative power out of the hands of the establishment 
and deliver it back to the public.19  In all, twenty-four states have 
adopted the initiative process in some binding capacity.20  Early 
on, direct democracy served its purpose quite well.  For example, 
in Oregon alone, there were initiatives passed for increased 
school funding, better working conditions, a corrupt practices act, 
a ban on poll taxes, and women’s suffrage.21  Given the “party 
machine politics” of the era, it is unlikely such extensive reform 
would have been possible without direct democracy.22 
 
16 Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 1191, 1194 (2005). Advisory measures can carry no real force, but this Note 
focuses on initiatives that create, amend, or repeal a law. See id. 
17 The set number varies from state to state. California, for example, requires 
signature “by electors equal in number to [five] percent in the case of a statute, and 
[eight] percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all 
candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election.” CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 8(b). 
18 Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1192. 
19 See id. 
20 Todd Donovan & Shawn Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the 
American States, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1, 4–7 (Sean Bowler et al. eds., 1998). 
21 Oregon Blue Book, Initiative, Referendum, and Recall: 1908–1910, 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections11.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).  
22 In the late nineteenth century, during the post-Civil War, pre-trust-buster 
era, large railroad companies and other monopolies were entrenched in political 
power through eminent domain, large land grants, and other laws passed seemingly 
“in the interest and on the demand of special interests to concentrate wealth and 
power in the hands of corporations and trusts.” See THOMAS GOEBEL, A 
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1890–1940, at 21 
(2002). Direct democracy was a grassroots movement led by disillusioned “agitators” 
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Since its early years, direct democracy has ebbed and flowed 
throughout the United States.  Few ballot measures were used in 
the 1920s.23  Usage was popular during the Great Depression, 
but slowed considerably after the U.S. entered World War II.24  
The initiative process made a strong comeback in the 1970s, 
highlighted by California’s controversial anti-tax proposition and 
has been prevalent ever since, with recurring themes including 
taxes, government spending, environmental protections, gay 
rights, abortion, and affirmative action.25 
Although, theoretically, anybody can become a sponsor by 
proposing an initiative and getting it on the ballot as long as he 
or she has enough support, the recent trend has been for 
“professional direct democracy firms [to] gather signatures and 
shop ballot titles while interest groups spend millions on 
advertising and political efforts.”26  This is understandable, as it 
is an arduous task for one person or a small group to get what 
may amount to hundreds of thousands of signatures in support of 
a particular proposal.  However, this trend, combined with other 
factors, has led to staunch criticism of the initiative process.27  
The initiative, so often used as a way to decide a hot-button 
issue, has become a hot-button issue itself. 
 
in order to overcome the apparent corruption that existed between the corporations 
and the two major parties. See id. at 19–21. 
23 Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1196. 
24 Id. 
25 Marcilynn A. Burke, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Exposing the Failures of 
Regulating Land Use Through the Ballot Box, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1453, 1455–
56 (2009). 
26 Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1193 (describing this trend nationally). See generally 
David McCuan et al., California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and 
the Initiative Process, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 20, at 55 (describing this trend in California). 
27 See infra Part II.B. Most criticism has involved the way in which initiatives 
are procured and the types of initiatives. See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203 
(lamenting the corporate media and interest group influence, as well as the trend 
towards taking away the rights of minorities); Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining 
Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 
1051–54 (2001) (criticizing the fact that the measures are fixed and unamendable, 
take no opposition into account, limit the deliberative options to a “yes” or “no,” and 
take advantage of an under-informed electorate). Some have argued that direct 
democracy is unconstitutional altogether. See Douglas H. Hsiao, Invisible Cities: The 
Constitutional Status of Direct Democracy in a Democratic Republic, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1267, 1271 (1992) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 211 (James Madison) (Charles 
A. Beard ed., 1948); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4) (arguing that direct democracy violates 
both Madisonian philosophy and the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of 
government). 
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B. Elements Necessary To Achieve Rule 24 Intervention as a 
Matter of Right 
In the types of cases that this Note examines—cases in 
which the constitutionality of a law is being questioned—the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern intervention.1  Rule 24, 
which entitles certain parties to intervene in a lawsuit as a 
matter of right, states, in relevant part:  
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene 
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated 
that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest.28 
This seemingly complicated rule can essentially be broken down 
into three distinct requirements an intervener must satisfy to be 
allowed into the lawsuit as a matter of right.29  First, the 
proposed intervener must have “a substantial legal interest  
in the subject matter of the case.”30  Second, the proposed 
intervener’s “ability to protect that interest may be impaired in 
the absence of intervention.”31  The third requirement is “that the 
parties already before the court may not adequately [protect the 
proposed intervener’s] interest.”32 
1. Interest 
The proposed intervener must be able to demonstrate “an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject 
of the action.”33  This is sometimes referred to as a “substantial 
legal interest,”34 or an interest that is “direct, substantial, and 
legally protectable.”35 
 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
29 This breakdown of the requirements of Rule 24 is set forth by the Sixth 
Circuit in Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit 
also includes a requirement that the application be timely. Id. at 397. 
30 Id. at 398. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
34 See Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 780 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grutter, 188 F.3d at 398). 
35 See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840–41 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 998 
F.2d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Perry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 
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Due to the complicated, somewhat ambiguous language 
used, deciding whether the interest requirement has been met is 
necessarily a “highly fact-specific determination.”36  Most circuits  
draw a somewhat liberal line toward determining that an 
interest exists and allowing intervention.37  That being said, the 
interest requirement “finds its own limits in the historic 
continuity of the subject of intervention.”38 
Some concrete examples help to give context to the interest 
requirement’s seemingly abstract legal jargon.  Cases in which 
the interest requirement is easily met include readily identifiable 
interests in property or funds,39 cases where the judgment would 
have a binding effect on the would-be intervener,40 and cases 
where a statutory scheme is being challenged and the proposed 
intervener is governed directly by that statutory scheme.41  
Examples of the types of cases in which it is more difficult to 
determine whether a sufficient interest exists are employment 
discrimination actions, civil rights suits, labor disputes, and 
environmental litigation, as generally no readily identifiable 
interest, binding effect, or directly governing scheme exists.42  In 
 
277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1908.1 (3d ed. 2009).  
36 See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz., 100 F.3d at 840–41 (quoting Security Ins. Co. v. 
Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.1986)) (“Rule 24 is broadly 
construed in favor of potential intervenors.”); Nat’l Farm Lines v. Interstate 
Commerce Comm’n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Our court has tended to 
follow a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention.”). 
38 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 405 (1967). 
39 A good example of this is a case where a bank was allowed to intervene in a 
foreclosure action because it held a note on the property being foreclosed on. See 
Lennox Indus. Inc. v. Caicedo Yusti, 172 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D.P.R. 1997). 
40 An example of this is a case where a party sought an injunction against a 
receiver’s lawyer from filing any suits on behalf of the receiver. See Exch. Nat’l Bank 
of Chi. v. Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 102 (D. Minn. 1968). The receiver was allowed to 
intervene because the receiver’s ability to use counsel of his choice would be bound 
by such judgment against his lawyer. See id. 
41 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35. An example of such a case can be seen 
where several labor unions were contesting sections of Michigan’s Campaign 
Finance Act. See Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1244 (6th Cir. 1997). 
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce was allowed to intervene in this case because 
the Chamber of Commerce was directly regulated by three of the four challenged 
provisions of the Act. See id. at 1246–47. 
42 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35. 
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these cases, the crux of determining whether the interest 
requirement has been met is whether the proposed intervener 
can show that its particular rights are in jeopardy.43 
Perhaps the most instructive way to frame the interest 
requirement is in terms of public policy.  On this front, “in the 
intervention area the ‘interest’ test is primarily a practical guide 
to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently 
concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due 
process.”44  This language implies that the scale may weigh more 
heavily in favor of finding the interest requirement to have been 
met when there is a strong possibility of separate future lawsuits 
by the proposed intervener if denied intervention.45 
2. Effect of the Action on the Interest 
If a sufficient interest is found, the proposed intervener must 
then prove that it “is so situated that disposing of the action may 
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to 
protect its interest.”46  This is sometimes couched in the more 
simple language of a requirement that the proposed intervener’s 
“ability to protect that interest may be impaired in the absence of 
intervention.”47   
This requirement is the least ambiguous of the three and  
the easiest to satisfy.48  Courts will generally consider any 
“significant legal effect,” not just the most easily recognizable 
 
43 Id. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 138 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing 
intervention where proposed interveners were prospective minority applicants for 
admission to a university and nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving higher 
educational opportunities for minority students in maintaining the use of race as a 
factor in the university’s admissions program, and the suit challenged the 
constitutionality of the school’s admissions policy), with Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 
1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying intervention of an anti-abortion lobbyist 
organization into a suit challenging a law restricting abortions, on the grounds that 
the organization’s interest in the protection of the unborn and its members’ 
purported interest in adopting children who survive abortions was not “direct and 
substantial”). 
44 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 
(D.C. Cir. 1967)).  
45 Seemingly following this train of thought, the Seventh Circuit has required 
that “[t]he interest must be so direct that the applicant would have ‘a right to 
maintain a claim for the relief sought.’ ” Keith, 764 F.2d at 1269 (quoting Heyman v. 
Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
47 Grutter, 138 F.3d at 398. 
48 See, e.g., Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1257 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(describing the burden of satisfying this element as “minimal”). 
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effect.49  Thus, recent cases have held that stare decisis alone 
may be sufficient to provide the practical disadvantage 
required.50  For example, stare decisis has been enough of a 
“significant legal effect” to meet the impairment requirement in 
cases where the proposed intervener claims an interest in the 
very property and very transaction that is the subject of the main 
action.51   
Going even further, some courts have held that such 
impairment or impediment need not even be “of a strictly legal 
nature.”52  Of course, this requirement is not met when the 
proposed intervener could protect its interest in a separate 
action.53  For example, the Government’s interest in enforcement 
of Title IX would be impaired if it was not allowed to intervene 
and the plaintiff settled.54  Similarly, the impairment 
requirement was satisfied where the grant of an injunction could 
prevent the proposed intervener from having the counsel of his 
choice in a future action he was planning,55 and a case where 
preclusion of a university from considering race as a factor in 
admissions could lead to a substantial decline in enrollment of 
minority students, some of whom were proposed interveners, also 
satisfied the impairment requirement.56  Overall, where the 
interest requirement is met, the impairment requirement 
generally follows.57 
 
49 See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978)) (noting that 
courts will go beyond considering just the binding effect of res judicata on a potential 
intervener in determining whether the applicant’s ability to protect its interest will 
be impeded). The most easily recognizable effects are mentioned above. See supra 
text accompanying notes 39–41.  
50 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1908.2. 
51 Id.; see, e.g., Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 
1967) (“When those coincide, the Court before whom the potential parties in the 
second suit must come must itself take the intellectually straight forward, realistic 
view that the first decision will in all likelihood be the second and the third and the 
last one.”). 
52 Coal. of Ariz., 100 F.3d at 844 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, 578 F.2d at 
1345). 
53 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1908.2. 
54 C.D. ex rel. A.B. v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 244 F.R.D. 144, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
55 Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 102–03 (D. Minn. 1968). 
56 Grutter v. Bollinger, 138 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999). 
57 Id. 
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3. Adequacy of Representation 
If a sufficient interest and a sufficient impairment are found, 
the intervention is to be allowed as of right unless the court is 
convinced that representation by the existing parties is 
adequate.58  Existing parties will generally be found inadequate 
to represent a proposed intervener’s interest where there is 
“proof of collusion between the representative and an opposing 
party,” where the representative has or represents an interest 
adverse to the intervener, or where the representative has failed 
in the fulfillment of his duty.59  Some courts have framed this as 
a burden on the proposed intervener to show “that the parties 
already before the court may not adequately represent the 
[proposed intervener’s] interest.”60  
The most important factor in determining whether 
representation is adequate is the relationship between the 
interest of the proposed intervener and the interest of the 
present parties.61  If the interest of the proposed intervener is 
either adverse to or ignored by the existing parties.62  An example 
of an adverse or ignored interest deeming representation 
inadequate can be found in a case where plaintiffs sued the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to end racial 
discrimination in employment and enrollment in schools 
receiving federal subsidies.63  A women’s rights group was 
allowed to intervene as of right in that case because a decision 
compelling the end of racial discrimination would have required 
a severe cut of funds for eliminating sex discrimination.64   
On the other end of the spectrum are cases where the 
representation is generally deemed adequate.  Adequacy is found 
where the proposed intervener’s interest is identical to that of the 
present parties.  Common examples include class actions and 
 
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). The language of the rule was changed in 1966, with 
the clear suggestion being that the burden of persuasion is now on the existing 
parties, not the intervener. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. Nevertheless, 
some courts have continued to place the burden on the proposed intervener.  
59 Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962). This is not a 
comprehensive list of all the ways a representation may be found to be inadequate 
but is merely a showing of circumstances that always denote inadequate 
representation. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. 
60 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909; see also Grutter, 138 F.3d at 397–98. 
61 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. 
62 See id. 
63 See Adams v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 417, 417–18 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
64 Id. at 418. 
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other cases where the existing parties will assert similar 
arguments and have the same stated goals of the proposed 
intervener.65  Additionally, adequacy is found where the proposed 
intervener’s interest is identical to that of the present parties or 
where the present party is charged by law with representing the 
proposed intervener’s interest.  Cases where the present party is 
charged by law with representing the proposed intervener’s 
interest include representation by administrators, trustees, 
fiduciaries, corporations, and school boards.66  Similarly, a state 
or local government is presumed to adequately represent the 
interests of its citizens.67   
The tough cases that can have unpredictable outcomes are 
those where the proposed intervener’s interest is similar, but not 
identical, to the interest of the existing parties.68  In such cases, 
the lynchpin seems to be whether the interest is closer to being 
adverse or ignored or closer to being identical.69  Therefore, a 
“discriminating appraisal” of the particular facts of the case is 
required,70 and the situation is resolved in favor of the proposed 
intervener if there is a serious possibility that the representation 
may be inadequate.71  
II. RECENT CASES AND COMMENTARY ON THE BALLOT INITIATIVE 
CONTROVERSY 
This Part analyzes the current state of the law and the 
problems it has created.  Part II.A analyzes the decisions and 
arguments proffered by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits for and 
against allowing intervention by sponsors of ballot initiatives in 
 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id.; Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280–81 (5th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the Attorney General could assert rights of all citizens who 
would be affected by a statute permitting prayer in public schools, including the 
rights of the proposed intervener religious organization). This presumption is 
rebuttable, however, upon a very strong showing of inadequate representation. See 
Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, in a suit to 
restrict snowmobiles in a national park because of its effect on wildlife, 
representation was inadequate where the government had failed to enforce anti-
snowmobile regulations several times in the past and the proposed intervener was a 
conservation group); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. 
68 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. 
69 See id. 
70 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(quoting 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909). 
71 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. 
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suits challenging the constitutionality of a passed law.  Part II.B 
discusses the current controversy over the use of ballot initiatives 
as a lawmaking tool by highlighting two major reasons why 
ballot initiatives are not always representative of the actual will 
of the public. 
A. The Circuit Split  
This Section highlights the conflicting rationales regarding 
Rule 24’s application to ballot sponsor intervention.  Part II.A.1 
examines the two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that 
have formed the contemporary basis for measuring the Rule in 
ballot sponsor cases.  This circuit has construed the Rule’s 
“interest” requirement liberally.  Part II.A.2 describes the Sixth 
Circuit’s break from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, applying Rule 
24 more strictly.  Part II.A.3 scrutinizes a recent Ninth Circuit 
decision that does not fully comport with either the reasoning 
from the earlier Ninth Circuit decision or that of the Sixth 
circuit. 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
The first of the landmark Ninth Circuit cases, Washington 
State Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. 
Spellman,72 was decided in 1982.  In Spellman, a public interest 
group called Don’t Waste Washington (“DWW”) sponsored a 
ballot initiative that prohibited “the transportation and storage 
within Washington of radioactive waste produced outside the 
state” and “gave permission for the state to enter into an 
interstate compact to solve the problem of radioactive waste on a 
regional basis.”73  After Washington voters passed the initiative, 
the state enacted legislation entering into an interstate 
compact.74  A group of radioactive dump sites in Washington that 
collected waste from outside the state sued the state of 
Washington arguing, inter alia, that the statute was 
unconstitutional.75  DWW petitioned to intervene, and the district 
court, without discussion, denied its motion.76  The Ninth Circuit 
 
72 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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reversed the denial and allowed intervention.77  The court held 
that “DWW, as the public interest group that sponsored the 
initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right.”78  
The court did not go into whether the proposed intervener had an 
interest, whether there would have been an impairment of that 
interest had the case been disposed of, or whether the state 
adequately represented DWW’s interest.  Instead, the court 
merely stated that “Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal 
construction in favor of applicants for intervention.”79 
The Ninth Circuit decided a second intervention case one 
year later in 1983, in Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt.  In 
Sagebrush, the Idaho Secretary of the Interior, under heavy 
lobbying influence from the Audubon Society, a nonprofit public 
interest environmental group, established a wildlife conservation 
area to protect endangered birds of prey.80  Sagebrush Rebellion, 
Inc., a group that opposed the conservation area and instead 
urged multiple-use management of the land, sued the Secretary 
of the Interior, alleging that the area violated federal land use 
laws.81  The Audubon Society sought intervention and the district 
court denied the motion.82  The Ninth Circuit reversed.83  The 
court held that since Rule 24 “traditionally has received a liberal 
construction in favor of applications for intervention” and this 
case was analogous to cases where a public interest group sought 
intervention in an action challenging the legality of a measure 
that it had supported, intervention as of right must be allowed.84  
Thus, even though this case did not directly involve a ballot 
sponsor, it reinforced the Spellman decision and perhaps gave 
even more credence to the Spellman rationale. 
 
 
77 Id. at 629–30. 
78 Id. at 630. 
79 Id. (citing 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1904 (1972)). 
80 Id. at 526–27. 
81 Id. at 526. 
82 Id. at 527. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (quoting Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 
F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
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2. The Sixth Circuit 
Two recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of Rule 24 to ballot 
sponsors.  The first case, Northland Family Planning, Inc. v. 
Cox,85 was decided in 2007.  In Cox, the Michigan legislature 
passed a law banning partial-birth abortion.86  The measure was 
proposed to the legislature by a citizen initiative petition.87  A 
group called Standing Together to Oppose Partial-Birth-Abortion 
(“STTOP”) handled the initiative process.88  STTOP was the 
ballot question committee of a group called Right to Life of 
Michigan, Inc. and had been formed specifically to promote the 
passage of the act.89  Several abortion doctors and health care 
facilities sued the state attorney general, arguing that the 
restriction was unconstitutional, and STTOP moved to intervene 
to defend the law.90  The district court denied STTOP’s motion,91 
and the Sixth Circuit upheld the denial.92  The court held that 
STTOP only had an ideological interest in the litigation because 
the lawsuit did not involve the regulation of STTOP’s conduct in 
any respect.93  Also important to the court’s determination was 
 
85 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007). 
86 Legal Birth Definition Act, P.A. 2004, No. 135, §§ 1–5 (2005) (codified as 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.1081–1085 (West 2010)), invalidated by Cox, 487 
F.3d at 339. 
87 Cox, 487 F.3d at 327. In a citizen initiative petition in Michigan, the 
legislature is presented with a petition after a certain number of signatures are 
procured, at which point the legislature can either vote to enact the proposal as is or 
refer it to a vote by the electorate. MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. In this case, the 
legislature voted to enact the proposal as is. Cox, 487 F.3d at 327. 
88 Cox, 487 F.3d at 328. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 The district court, in its denial of intervention, analogized STTOP’s 
“generalized interest in one issue” to cases where “[t]hose supporting a certain 
legislation, including legislators, have been denied intervention because individual 
legislators who voted for the enactment of certain legislation do not have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of an enacted legislation.” Northland Family 
Planning, Inc. v. Cox, 394 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998)), 
aff’d, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007). Also important to the district court’s decision was 
the fact that “[a]nti-abortion groups are not traditionally permitted to intervene in 
constitutional challenges to state and local laws regulating abortion.” Id. (citing 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986)). 
92 Cox, 487 F.3d at 327. 
93 Id. at 345. The court compared STTOP to the proposed interveners in Grutter, 
who were prospective minority applicants for admission to a university in a suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the school’s admission policy. Id. (citing Grutter 
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that STTOP was not a repeat player in similar legislation and 
was created specifically for the one ballot initiative.94  The court 
further distinguished between this case and cases where the 
procedure required to pass a rule, rather than the rule itself, was 
being challenged.95  Finally, the court warned that allowing 
intervention of public interest groups in similar situations could 
lead to “over-politicization of the judicial process.”96 
The second of the Sixth Circuit cases, Coalition To Defend 
Affirmative Action v. Granholm,97 was decided in 2007, just a few 
months after Cox.  In Granholm, a ballot initiative was passed 
that amended Michigan’s Constitution to outlaw affirmative 
action in public education, public employment, and public 
contracting.98  The initiative was sponsored by the Michigan Civil 
Rights Initiative Committee (“MCRI”) and the American Civil 
Rights Foundation (“ACRF”), two anti-affirmative action groups 
who “were at the forefront of the protracted campaign to adopt 
[the proposal] and are committed to ensuring its constitutionality 
and timely implementation.”99  Plaintiffs, a number of pro-
affirmative action public interest groups and minority 
individuals, sued Michigan’s Governor as well as several 
universities that would be charged with implementing the ban.100  
The suit alleged, inter alia, that the prohibition was 
unconstitutional.101  MCRI and ACRF sought intervention but 
were denied by the district court.102  The Sixth Circuit upheld the 
denial.103  Citing its reasoning in Cox, the court held that the 
 
v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Grutter group had a substantial 
legal interest because their conduct would be regulated by the legislation. Id. 
94 Id. (“[W]here STTOP was created and continues to exist for the purpose of 
passing and upholding the Act, its legal interest can be said to be limited to the 
passage of the Act rather than the state’s subsequent implementation and 
enforcement of it.”). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 346. 
97 501 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2007). Granholm was decided in September 2007 while 
Cox was decided in June 2007. 
98 Id. at 776. 
99 Id. at 780. 
100 Id. at 778. 
101 Id. 
102 The district court denied intervention because it found that “[the proposed 
interveners] have not asserted that whatever ruling this Court hands down will 
have an impact on the vitality of the organizations, subject them to regulation, or 
expand or curtail their rights as organizations.” Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action 
v. Granholm, 240 F.R.D. 368, 375 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
103 Granholm, 501 F.3d at 779. 
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proposed interveners’ “status as organizations involved in the 
process leading to the adoption of [the proposal was] insufficient 
to provide them with a substantial legal interest in a lawsuit 
challenging the validity of those portions of Michigan’s 
constitution amended by [the proposal].”104  The court rejected 
the proposed interveners’ argument that the litigation affected 
them directly because some of their members were Michigan 
residents, saying that this amounted to a mere “general 
ideological interest . . . shared by the entire Michigan 
citizenry.”105 
3. Gonzalez v. Arizona: A Middle Ground 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. Arizona, 
decided several months before the two Sixth Circuit cases, 
further complicates matters.106  This decision is consistent with 
the Spellman and Sagebrush precedent in finding a “substantial 
legal interest,” yet, unlike in those cases, intervention here was 
ultimately denied because the court deemed the representation to 
be adequate.107  In Gonzalez, a ballot initiative was passed 
requiring all Arizona voters to show identification when they vote 
at the polls and to present proof of citizenship for voter 
registration.108  A group called “Yes on Proposition 200” had 
sponsored the initiative.109  A contingent consisting of several 
Arizona residents, community organizations, and Indian tribes 
sued the state of Arizona and various state election officials, 
 
104 Id. at 781–82 (citing Northland Family Planning, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 
346 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
105 Id. at 782. A vigorous Granholm dissent sought to follow the Ninth Circuit 
precedent and attempted to distinguish Cox on the grounds that this case involved 
an initiative that was not enacted by the legislature and that the named defendants 
here had explicitly shown that they were not receptive to anti-affirmative action law. 
Id. at 784–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent 
argued that the Governor, who was among the named defendants, had publicly 
opposed the ballot initiative and that the named defendants had already 
compromised with the plaintiffs and agreed to an unlawful injunction, showing a 
strong possibility that they would not be the best parties to defend the suit and thus 
strengthening the proposed interveners’ interest. Id. at 786–87. 
106 This decision represents a middle ground between the prior Ninth Circuit 
rationale and the Sixth Circuit decisions.  In particular, the court here interpreted 
the “interest” requirement of Rule 24 liberally, yet carefully scrutinized and 
ultimately rejected the sponsor’s claim that representation was inadequate. See 
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1046. 
109 Id. at 1051. 
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arguing, inter alia, that the measure was unconstitutional.110  
“Yes on Proposition 200” moved to intervene and was denied by 
the district court.111  The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial.112  
Keeping with the circuit’s tradition and providing more detail 
than its prior decisions, the court held that the proposed 
intervener had a substantial legal interest that would be 
impaired if the action was disposed of.113  In an interesting turn, 
however, the court held that “[w]here ‘the government is acting 
on behalf of a constituency it represents,’ as it is here, this court 
assumes that the government will adequately represent that 
constituency”114 and that its prior decision in Sagebrush had 
turned on “the lack of any real adversarial relationship between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants.”115  The court held that, 
because the defendants had not indicated that they were 
unwilling or unable to defend the suit and indeed had done so at 
every level of the federal courts, there was not a “very compelling 
showing” that the defendants would not adequately represent the 
proposed intervener’s interest.116 
B. Current Ballot Initiative Controversy 
Direct democracy became popular based on the idea that 
ballot measures “embody the consent of the governed and  
thereby achieve democratic legitimacy without the need for 
‘accountability’ that arises from the delegation of lawmaking 
authority to an agent of the people.”117  Sometimes, however, the 
solution to a problem may end up causing more difficulties than 
the original issue.  Critics contend that this has been the case 
with ballot initiatives, as disparagement of the process and the 
societal problems they create seem to increase by the day, to the 
point that ballot initiatives no longer seem to be in the public 
interest.  These criticisms can be divided into two major groups.  
The first is that experience with the legislative and initiative 
 
110 Id. at 1046. 
111 Id. at 1051. 
112 Id. at 1052. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. (quoting Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
115 Id. This statement is somewhat puzzling considering there is no mention of 
such lacking by the Sagebrush Court. 
116 Id. (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
117 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1253, 1263 (2009); supra Part I.A. 
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processes has shown that the legislature is better suited to 
lawmaking than the electorate.  The second is that special 
interest groups have exacerbated the “democratic legitimacy” 
problem by commandeering the initiative system and fashioning 
it into a tool for minority oppression.  This Note later argues that 
because of the issues raised by these criticisms, reform is 
necessary to temper the influence of ballot initiatives.  One 
desirable solution is to invariably deny intervention of ballot 
sponsors into suits challenging the constitutionality of the passed 
law.118 
1. The Electorate’s Suitability to Lawmaking Compared to the 
Legislature’s 
“A well-functioning democratic system not only aggregates 
preferences, it also provides opportunities for refinement of 
proposals, informed deliberation, consensus-building, and 
compromise.”119  A legislative setting is conducive to these goals, 
as representatives from each side with varying constituent 
interests must work together to come to a result that all parties 
can live with.120  On the other hand, the process by which a ballot 
initiative becomes law flies in the face of such goals.  The 
initiative process is a “battering ram” that bypasses our 
fundamental system of checks and balances to achieve a quick 
resolution to a hot-button issue.121  
First, ballot sponsors in many states have absolute control 
over the framing of the measure and how it will be worded on the 
ballot.122  Opponents and other interested parties are essentially 
excluded from the drafting process, as in many states “[t]here are 
 
118 See discussion infra Part III. 
119 Miller, supra note 27, at 1051. 
120 This may be more or less pronounced depending on how much of a majority is 
held by a particular party and how many votes are needed, but the overall premise 
remains the same because of the process of legislative debate, committee and 
subcommittee hearings, votes, and deliberations. See Project Vote Smart, 
Government 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, http://www.votesmart.org/resource_ 
govt101_02.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
121 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1051 (quoting V.O. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W. 
CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 458 (1939)). 
122 See id. at 1051–52. Some states, however, do have laws allowing the 
language of the initiative on the ballot to be reworded by the attorney general or 
other state official. See, e.g., Ballotpedia.org, Laws Governing the Initiative Process 
in Oregon, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Laws_governing_the_initiative_ 
process_in_Oregon (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
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no open meeting laws, public notice requirements, hearings to 
solicit public input, or other guarantees to give the press and 
public access to the drafting and editing stages of the initiative 
policy-making process.”123  Furthermore, the fact that a voter can 
only vote “yes” or “no” and does not have the legislative options of 
adding input, amending, or voting for alternate legislation that 
will likely lead to an “inaccurate barometer” of the voters’ true 
opinions.124  This atmosphere, where opponents have no leverage 
to force compromises, incentivizes polarization rather than 
consensus building.125 
Additionally, the electorate is typically not as knowledgeable 
as members of the legislature in terms of policy and thus many 
times does not make an informed decision.  In fact, political 
scientists have for decades almost universally accepted the fact 
that most citizens lack even basic political knowledge.126  “If 
citizens do not know about the existence of a policy issue, they 
will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences on its 
most desirable resolution.”127  Indeed, the public tendency with 
regard to questions about policy is to simply make up its answers 
on the spot due to a lack of a preexisting view on the issue128 and 
a complete lack of knowledge about the content of the initiative 
 
123 Miller, supra note 27, at 1052 (commenting on California’s initiative process). 
124 See id. at 1053–54. 
125 Id. at 1053 n.48 (“For many initiative campaigns the basic strategy comes 
down to two main tasks. First, make the initiative controversial so that the public is 
paying attention. Second, define the sides so you are the good guys and the other 
side is evil incarnate.” (quoting JIM SCHULTZ, THE INITIATIVE COOKBOOK: RECIPES 
AND STORIES FROM CALIFORNIA’S BALLOT WARS 7 (1996))). 
126 Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1266 n.51 (“The claim that citizens lack 
political information has a long and respected history.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
DILEMMA 17 (1998))); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy 
Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST 
EXAMINED BRANCH 45, 47 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (“It is an 
article of faith among political scientists that citizens are woefully uninformed about 
politics, and scholars have rarely resorted to understatement in characterizing the 
public’s knowledge gaps.”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of 
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2004) (“The most important 
point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the 
majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”). 
127 Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1267. 
128 See id. at 1267–68. Political scientist John R. Zaller formulated this assertion 
based on empirical evidence from several surveys and experiments regarding 
“seemingly irreverent features of questionnaire design [that] affect the responses 
given.” See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 77 (1992). 
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measure.129  The outcome is that, in many cases, the result of 
ballot questions depends on how the issue is framed or how the 
question is posed.130  These variables are generally controlled by 
the ballot sponsor.131 
Critics also contend that the lack of informed deliberation 
and consensus building debate has created an atmosphere 
conducive to further problems.  Because the only time ballot 
sponsors are generally forced to make any kind of statement 
about their proposal is upon submission to the state for 
certification, they can easily avoid both being pinned down to a 
specific purpose and answering opponent’s questions.132  Thus, 
ballot sponsors can be as broad and ambiguous as possible in 
order to control the message to the electorate.133  This allows for 
“bait-and-switch” scenarios, where a ballot proposal seems 
moderate leading up to the election yet on enactment has wide 
ranging partisan collateral consequences.134  Combined with 
other societal issues borne out of this atmosphere,135 the 
legislature is better suited to lawmaking than the voting 
public.136 
Proponents of direct democracy contend that although these 
concerns may exist, they pale in comparison to both the 
 
129 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1053 (citing Elisabeth R. Gerber, Prospects for 
Reforming the Initiative Process, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER 
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001); see also DAVID MAGLEBY, 
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
139–44 (1984). 
130 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1053–54. 
131 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
132 See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 17, 35–39 (commenting on Michigan’s initiative process). 
133 See id. at 35–38. 
134 Id. Glen Staszewski, an Associate Professor at Michigan State University 
College of Law, specifically writes about a 2004 ballot initiative that purported only 
to define marriage as “a union between husband and wife” but ended up having the 
legal effect of stopping employers from providing domestic benefits on enactment, a 
consequence that was denied or ignored by the sponsors leading up to the vote. Id. at 
21–29. 
135 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Lead Judge Denounces State’s Glut of Measures, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A23 (quoting California Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Ronald M. George as saying that “California’s lawmakers, and the state itself, have 
been placed in a fiscal straitjacket by a steep two-thirds-vote requirement—imposed 
at the ballot box—for raising taxes,” and “Frequent amendments—coupled with the 
implicit threat of more in the future—have rendered our state government 
dysfunctional, at least in times of severe economic decline.”). 
136 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  
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corruption in legislative government137 and the impediment to 
free speech that would occur if ballot initiatives were 
precluded.138 Others argue that these issues can be resolved 
through tweaks in the ballot initiative system involving 
increased regulation and oversight.139   
2. The Influence of Special Interests in the Initiative Process 
Currently, one of the biggest criticisms of ballot initiatives is 
that big money special interest groups have managed to wedge 
themselves to the forefront of what is generally thought to be 
“lawmaking by the people.”  Ballot sponsors typically represent 
particular special interests or are “multimillionaires who seek to 
influence public policy on their pet issues.”140  They lead the way 
in each stage of the initiative process, from conceiving of the 
measure and drafting it to obtaining the signatures, advertising 
it, and in some circuits, defending the law in subsequent  
suits after passage.141  In most cases, professional members of  
the “initiative industry” are also used as consultants, mostly  
for promotion, advertising, and “spin.”142  Professional “bounty-
hunters” gather signatures, getting paid up to $2.50 per name.143 
The first consequence of this scheme is that it is very 
costly.144  Critics assert that this cost has essentially driven “the 
people” out of the process altogether, as most ordinary citizens do 
not have the time and funds required for such an endeavor.145  
 
137 See GOEBEL, supra note 22, at 22; Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1192. 
138 See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 278–79 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting 
that subject matter restrictions on ballot initiative content that serve no important 
state interest would impermissibly burden protected speech). This Note is concerned 
less with the constitutional argument and more with the idea proffered by initiative 
proponents that the process represents the “will of the people” and thus should not 
be restricted. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and 
Applying the Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 412–20 
(2003). 
139 See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1230–34. 
140 See Staszewski, supra note 138, at 421. 
141 See Staszewski, supra 132, at 34–35. 
142 Id. 
143 See Staszewski, supra note 138, at 425. 
144 See id. at 421; Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04; Miller, supra note 27, at 
1058. 
145 See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04; Miller, supra note 27, at 1058–59; 
Staszewski, supra note 138, at 420; id. at 426 (“Commentators have also recognized 
that ‘money increasingly appears to be a necessary condition’ for waging a successful 
ballot campaign.” (quoting Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct 
Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (1999))). 
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Additionally, money has been even more influential in defeating 
those few proposals that are “initiated by ad hoc groupings of 
concerned citizens.”146  Indeed, opponents of an initiative win 
eighty percent of the time when they outspend proponents.147  Big 
money interests have also used a tactic called a counter 
initiative, placing a competing initiative on the ballot using 
similar yet more favorable language in order to confuse the voter 
into rejecting both proposals.148 
According to critics, another consequence of a system led by 
special interests is that the public has become a mere pawn in 
“lawmaking by the people.”149  One example is the degradation of 
the signature requirement.  While the signature requirement 
was originally imposed to ensure sufficient public support for a 
measure and to weed out frivolous proposals, it has now 
seemingly lost its teeth.  It has become common practice for 
signature gatherers to encourage registered voters to sign in 
order to “let the people decide” without encouraging them to even 
read the measure, let alone engage in substantial discourse over 
whether it should be placed on the ballot.150  Another example is 
the way that big money interests conduct advertising and  
 
lobbying.  They typically bombard the electorate with discourse 
 
146 See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT 
ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 251 (1987)). This fact has been well 
documented, and examples include opponents of universal healthcare in Oregon 
beating an initiative by outspending proponents thirty-two to one, opponents of 
required labeling of genetically modified foods beating such initiative by outspending 
proponents forty to one, Montana mining interests beating an environmental 
initiative by spending nine dollars per vote, and Arizona gambling interests 
defeating a measure by outspending proponents 364 to one. Id. at 1205. 
147 Id.  
148 See id. (“In 1988, Californians faced five auto insurance and tort initiatives: 
two sponsored by consumer groups and trial lawyers, and three counter-initiatives 
sponsored by the insurance industry. After the then-most expensive campaign in 
state history, voters rejected all but one of the initiatives.”); Staszewski, supra note 
138, at 429. 
149 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1058–59. This coincides with the fact that voters 
are generally powerless to shape or express their true opinions about a particular 
measure. See id.; discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
150 Staszewski, supra note 138, at 424–25 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE 
POWER OF MONEY 54 (2000)). 
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through print media, radio, and television in a “simplistic, 
partisan, and sometimes misleading fashion.”151 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the current way 
in which initiatives are commonly procured is the ability of the 
majority to use initiatives to take away minority rights.  “When it 
comes to laws that discriminate against minorities, initiatives 
can easily play to popular prejudices,”152 as a simple majority will 
win out over even the most stringent minority.  Critics of direct 
democracy argue that the lack of checks and balances, combined 
with the free reign of special interest groups, have led to such 
practices.153  Recent examples in California alone include the 
aforementioned Proposition 8,154 as well as initiatives to take 
away rights of racial minorities,155 illegal immigrants, and 
criminal defendants.156   
Taken as a whole, these developments suggest that the 
arguments of those supporting ballot initiatives—that initiatives 
 
151 Id. at 428 (citing BRODER, supra note 150, at 52) (describing the initiative 
industry as “a huge industry devoted to the manipulation of public opinion”); see also 
CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 254 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining that 
campaign advertising in ballot contests has developed “a reputation for innuendo, 
deception and exaggeration”); ZISK, supra note 146, at 264 (finding that ballot 
campaign advertisements are “simplistic” at best and “deceptive” at worst); Julian 
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1517 (1990) 
(claiming that “[i]llustrations of deceptive advertising and sloganeering abound” in 
ballot campaigns); Phillip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative 
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 441 (1998) (claiming that a “largely unmotivated and 
unaccountable electorate is much more prone to influence by campaigns based on 
fear and misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation”); Becky Kruse, 
Comment, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads 
Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 147–50 (2001) 
(criticizing the use of “increasingly sophisticated, often misleading ads” in ballot 
campaigns and providing several notable examples); Daniel H. Lowenstein, 
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice 
Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 570 (1982) (indicating that 
ballot campaigns are “marked by gross exaggeration, distortion, and outright 
deception”); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas 
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 131 (1995) (recognizing that advertising in 
initiative campaigns is “avowedly partisan and intended to persuade rather than 
inform”). 
152 Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1209. 
153 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1056–57. 
154 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009).  
155 See Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 777, 784 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
156 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1056–57. 
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represents the freely expressed “will of the people” and are 
necessary due to corruptive legislatures—no longer apply.157  
Rather than the “will of the people,” critics contend that ballot 
initiatives have essentially become the “will of the sponsor,” and 
the legislatures, while possibly still corrupted by lobbying 
influence,158 are no longer engaged in the type of “party machine 
politics” for which initiatives were originally created.159  Even 
taking current lobbying into account, it seems the public 
manipulation involved in the initiative process may be a greater 
evil,160 especially when coupled with the inherent disadvantage in 
lawmaking by the electorate discussed above.161  These problems 
have made it increasingly clear that reform is needed. 
III. DENIAL OF INTERVENTION AS A JUDICIALLY SOUND SOLUTION 
This Note maintains that reform is necessary to curb some of 
the problems that critics of ballot initiatives have identified.  One 
possible solution to the ballot initiative problem is to invariably 
deny intervention of ballot sponsors into suits challenging the 
constitutionality of the passed law.  This small step will prevent 
abuse by creating a “second-check” on ballot initiatives and 
providing for a more honest and intelligent deliberation.  Section 
A contends that such denial is in full conformity with Rule 24 
because ballot sponsors do not meet the three requirements for 
intervention.  Section B examines the possible ramifications of 
 
157 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
158 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying 
Regulations in State Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW. 375, 406 (2008). But see James M. 
Demarco, Note, Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why Lobbying Reform Is 
Unimportant, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 599, 612–17 (1994). 
159 The entrenchment of large railroad companies and other monopolies in 
government was considerably lessened by the trust-buster era. See GOEBEL, supra 
note 22, at 119 (“Corporations might often use illicit means in their quest for 
monopolistic control over a particular industry; they rarely, however, had to resort to 
those direct subsidies that had so troubled nineteenth-century antimonopolists.”). 
Furthermore, even assuming that monied interests still have a large influence in 
government currently, the sources provided in this Section show that the monied 
interests now have perhaps an even greater influence in initiative law due to their 
ability to control the process. In other words, initiatives are no longer a grassroots 
cure to legislative corruption. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
160 See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04 (describing a modern trend in 
California towards lobbyists spending more money on influencing voters on ballot 
initiatives than on influencing state legislators). 
161 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
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such denial and identifies recourse available to ballot initiative 
proponents. 
A. Ballot Sponsors Do Not Meet Rule 24’s Interest Requirement 
As explained above, any attempted intervention in a suit 
governed by federal law must be analyzed through the lens of the 
requirements of Rule 24.162  If the proposed intervener does not 
meet each of the requirements, then intervention cannot be 
granted as a matter of right.163  A party proposing to intervene 
solely based on the fact that it sponsored the initiative at issue 
fails to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24 and thus cannot 
be granted intervention as of right. 
No compelling argument has yet been made that a  
group attempting to intervene in a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of a law it brought to the ballot has any interest 
that is “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.”164  The Ninth 
Circuit decisions granting intervener in such cases certainly did 
not make one.  The Spellman and Sagebrush courts stated, 
rather conclusory, that the ballot sponsor in each case was 
entitled to intervention “as the public interest group that 
sponsored the initiative” because “Rule 24 traditionally has 
received a liberal construction in favor of applicants for 
intervention.”165   
Compare this bare-bones analysis with that of the Sixth 
Circuit.  The Northland and Granholm courts measured the 
interest requirement through a number of factors, similar to the 
ones discussed above.166  They took into account whether the 
proposed intervener’s conduct was being regulated in any respect 
by the impending litigation,167 whether the group was a major 
player regarding the current issue or an initiative-centered 
group,168 and whether the law itself was being challenged rather 
 
162 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
163 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
164 See sources cited supra note 35. 
165 Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 
(9th Cir. 1982); see also Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (quoting Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630). 
166 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
167 See Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 345 (6th 
Cir. 2007). 
168 See id. 
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than the way the initiative came to the ballot.169  It was through 
a thorough analysis of all these factors that the those courts 
ultimately decided that the “status as organizations involved in 
the process leading to the adoption of [a proposal] is insufficient 
to provide them with a substantial legal interest in a lawsuit 
challenging the validity of those portions of Michigan’s 
constitution amended by [a proposal].”170  
Not only are the Sixth Circuit decisions more thoroughly 
reasoned than the Ninth Circuit’s decisions but an analysis of 
prior case law through the interest lens yields the same result.  
In ballot sponsor cases, the proposed intervener has no readily 
identifiable interest in property or funds,171 and the judgment 
would have no more binding effect on the would-be intervener 
than it would on every other citizen in the jurisdiction.172  The 
proposed intervener cannot, just by the virtue of having 





169 See id. 
170 Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 
2007) (citing Cox, 487 F.3d at 346). The dissent in Granholm argued that an interest 
does in fact exist but couched its argument in an analysis of the adequacy of the 
representation. Id. at 784–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[T]he possibility of conflict creates a substantial interest.”). 
171 The mere fact that a ballot sponsor has spent a large amount of money to 
advocate for the initiative being challenged and does not want that money to have 
been spent for naught, does not give it a direct interest in defending the 
constitutionality of the law. Cf. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir. 1985)  
In an America whose freedom is secured by its ever vigilant guard on the 
openness of its “marketplace of ideas,” [an anti-abortion lobbying company] 
is encouraged to thrive, and to speak, lobby, promote, and persuade, so that 
its principles may become, if it is the will of the majority, the law of the 
land. Such a priceless right to free expression, however, does not also 
suggest that [the lobbyist] has a right to intervene in every lawsuit 
involving abortion rights, or to forever defend statutes it helped to enact. 
Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of lawsuits, even “public law” suits, as 
necessary forums for such public policy debates. 
Id.; Resort Timeshare Resales, Inc. v. Stuart, 764 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (S.D. Fla. 
1991). Based on the Keith Court’s reasoning then, any money spent by the ballot 
sponsor is an exercise of free expression, not a guarantee that the sponsor will see 
results in the form of a passed law. Furthermore, in the type of suits this Note 
addresses, the issue is the constitutionality of the law, not the funds spent by any 
party.  
172 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35. 
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rights are in jeopardy.173  Indeed, absent other circumstances, the 
only interest a ballot sponsor has in the litigation is a purely 
ideological one.174 
Finally, the ballot sponsor’s interest can be looked at through 
the public policy of efficiency that the interest requirement was 
partially designed to uphold: “disposing of lawsuits by involving 
as many . . . persons as is compatible with efficiency and due 
process.”175  Through this lens, the sponsor has no substantial 
interest either.  Since on its own, the sponsor would have no 
claim for relief, denying intervention does not damage the public 
policy of the avoidance of future lawsuits.176  Since allowing 
intervention to ballot sponsors as a matter of right would not 
advance any of the policies for which the interest requirement 
was created and would contradict the language and prior 
examples of the requirement, such intervention should be 
invariably denied.   
Although failure to satisfy the interest requirement 
generally precludes consideration of any of the other elements of 
Rule 24,177 a ballot sponsor arguably also fails to meet Rule 24’s 
third requirement, inadequacy of representation, because 
representation by the existing parties would be adequate.178  The 
 
173 See sources cited supra note 43.  
174 Granholm, 501 F.3d at 782 (“Where . . . an organization has only a general 
ideological interest in the lawsuit—like seeing that the government zealously 
enforces some piece of legislation that the organization supports—and the lawsuit 
does not involve the regulation of the organization’s conduct, without more, such an 
organization’s interest in the lawsuit cannot be deemed substantial.”). 
175 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 
700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). 
176 Indeed, there can be no suit maintained for ideological relief. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 1.  
177 See, e.g., Granholm, 501 F.3d at 780; 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, 
§ 1908.2 (“If an interest sufficient to satisfy Rule 24(a) is found, it is then necessary to 
decide whether the would-be intervener ‘is so situated that disposing of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its 
interest.’ ” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. § 1909 (“[Rule 24] allows a 
person who has an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject matter of 
the action and who is so situated that disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest to intervene of right 
‘unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.’ ” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24)). 
178 Rule 24’s second requirement—that the proposed intervener “is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
applicant’s ability to protect that interest”—would likely be satisfied if the ballot 
sponsor was found to have a sufficient interest, as it is a “minimal” standard. See, 
e.g., Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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sponsor’s ideological interest can be framed one of two ways:  
Either the sponsor is interested in upholding its own beliefs179 or 
feels that it must uphold the “will of the public.”180  The sponsor’s 
interest in upholding its own beliefs is the main interest 
addressed by the Sixth Circuit and is insubstantial for the 
reasons described above.181  Even if “upholding the will of the 
people” could possibly be considered a “direct, substantial, and 
legally protectable” interest rather than an ideological one, based 
on the problems of ballot initiatives in both their influence by 
special interests and their lawmaking deficiency, it is clear that 
the named defendants in any suit regarding the constitutionality 
of a law would be better suited to represent the “will of the 
people” than the ballot sponsor would be.182  Thus, the existing 
parties to the suit would adequately represent that interest, and 
ballot sponsors would not have a leg to stand on in this respect. 
B. Intervener’s “Second-Check” as a Solution to the Ballot 
Initiative Problem 
The denial of the intervention of ballot sponsors in all cases 
in which the constitutionality of a passed initiative is challenged 
is not only consistent with Rule 24 but will allow the named 
defendant to conduct a “second check” as to whether the ballot 
initiative is truly in the public interest.  The defendant will then 
have the power to decide whether the law should be upheld.  
Courts have denied intervention to a ballot sponsor on the basis 
that “[w]here ‘the government is acting on behalf of a 
constituency it represents’ . . . [the] court assumes that the 
 
179 See id. at 1246. 
180 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33–34 & 34 n.4, Granholm, 501 F.3d 775 
(No. 06-2656), 2007 WL 5107939 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief] (arguing 
that the proposed interveners had a substantial interest in part because “the people 
themselves are the legislators” in this case and have “taken the trouble to organize 
into public interest groups to act as ‘vital participants in the democratic process’ ”). 
181 See sources cited supra notes 167–74 and accompanying text. Furthermore, 
the sponsor’s interest in upholding the “will of the people” is insubstantial as well, as 
even if ballot initiatives did represent the true “will of the people,” sponsors would 
still have to find a way to get around the fact that this interest was ideological 
rather than “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.” The proposed interveners 
in Granholm attempted to do so by analogizing to legislator intervention to defend 
laws in suits against the executive branch. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra 
note 180, at 33–34. 
182 See discussion supra Part II.B.1–2. 
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government will adequately represent that constituency.”183  
Similarly, they have also denied intervention because the 
defendants had not indicated that they were unwilling or unable 
to defend the suit and indeed had defended it at every level of the 
federal courts.  There was not a “very compelling showing” that 
the defendants would not adequately represent the proposed 
intervener’s interest.184  This analysis is not objectionable, but it 
assumes that the ballot sponsor has met the interest 
requirement.  
Following the argument that the lone fact that the proposed 
intervener is a ballot sponsor cannot satisfy the interest 
requirement,185 there is no reason why the named defendants 
need to show that they are willing to zealously defend the suit or 
represent any interest that the proposed intervener purports to 
have.186  If the named defendant—whether it be the state, the 
state attorney general, the governor, or a member of the state 
legislature—decides, upon an evaluation of the initiative itself 
and the way it was procured, that it does not truly represent the 
will of the people, then the named defendant should be allowed to 
choose not to vigorously defend the initiative and essentially 
concede the law’s unconstitutionality to the initiative’s 
challengers. 
The named defendant has great incentive to ascertain the 
will of the public because, operating under the assumption that 
at least some of the named defendants in each case are elected 
officials,187 identifying the will of the people may well determine 
the longevity of his or her political life.188  Theoretically, the 
failure to defend a ballot initiative that the electorate truly 
supported would be political suicide, while the failure to defend 
an initiative that was based on manipulation of the public by a 
single special interest group would have little negative political 
 
183 See Gonzales v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Prete v. 
Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
184 Id. (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
185 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
186 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1904. 
187 This was the situation in each of the cases discussed in this Note. See 
discussion supra Part II.A. 
188 The fact that politicians and judges have been reluctant to go against ballot 
initiatives for fear of being voted out of office for having rejected the “will of the 
people” is well documented. See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1239. 
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ramification.189  In any event, the mere fact that a further review 
of the procedure was being conducted, and the fact that the 
named defendants yielded such power free from the intervention 
of the ballot sponsor, would promote more honest preelection 
debate as well as weed out ballot initiatives that did not enact 
the true will of the people.190 
Since the named defendant has such incentive to ascertain 
the will of the people in order to make a judgment on the 
initiative, he or she should look to the problems that exist with 
initiatives and proposals that have been made for reform to set a 
framework for analysis of the particular initiative at issue.  In 
terms of ensuring initiatives are representative of the public will, 
the main goal that reform proposals have focused on is increasing 
public discourse and political debate on initiatives.191  Another 
 
189 In this situation, if the elected official believes that the public truly did not 
want the initiative passed in the first place, he can decline to defend with little risk 
of being voted out of office based on that decision. If he believes the electorate truly 
did want the law, he will fear political accountability for his actions and thus feel a 
duty to defend the law. Of course, one decision does not always make or break a 
politician’s reelection, but elected officials do have a duty to uphold the wishes of 
their constituents, and elected officials often make decisions based on how they 
believe the electorate will react. See Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1275 (“[P]olitical 
scientists have argued that the electorate’s lack of information about politics can be 
overcome by the fact that elected officials must anticipate the preferences of their 
constituents to avoid making decisions that could be used against them in future 
elections . . . . [T]his phenomenon does exist and it may help the electorate exercise 
some control over policy discretion without engaging in vigilant oversight of public 
officials . . . .”). In the rare potential event of a case where the named defendant has 
no reason to care what the electorate thinks because he or she will not be running 
for reelection—perhaps due to term limits, retirement, et cetera—there are two 
possible scenarios. The named defendant may agree with the initiative that was 
passed, at which point he or she would defend it wholeheartedly. The other scenario 
is that the named defendant has a personal disagreement with the initiative and no 
real incentive to ascertain the true will of the public. In the event of the second 
scenario, it seems that the named defendant would have free reign to defeat the law, 
and the only recourse for the public or the ballot sponsors would be to pass a similar 
initiative again after the particular politician’s term had expired. Still, this would 
seemingly be a rare occasion, does include eventual recourse, and is not unlike the 
situation of a lack of public accountability faced by “lame duck” politicians in the 
normal legislative context. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1269. 
190 Cf. sources cited infra note 191. 
191 See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1245–46 (arguing that voter education, and 
thus public discourse, through pamphlets and transparency of funding are necessary 
reforms); Miller, supra note 27, at 1073; Staszewski, supra note 132, at 58–59 
(arguing that judges holding ballot sponsors to statements they made during the 
campaign would curtail manipulation of the voters and lead to more honest public 
debate about the issues); Staszewski, supra note 138, at 453–54 (arguing that ballot 
sponsors should be held to the same “reasoned decisionmaking” standard as 
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heavily proposed reform in a similar vein has been ensuring that 
the people are not confused about the language of the initiative 
and strongly support the initiative as it is to be carried out.192  
These two reforms should form the bedrock for a named 
defendant to approach a decision as to whether or not a ballot 
initiative represents the will of the public.193 
Sponsors of ballot initiatives are not without recourse.  If the 
initiative is truly in the public interest, the named defendant will 
either defend the law to the best of his or her ability or risk 
political backlash, at which point the climate would be more ripe 
for such change.194  There are generally few, if any, limitations on 
the number of initiatives a sponsor can propose, so the sponsor, if 
need be, could go through the process again at that time with a 
higher likelihood of success.195  Furthermore, the court could, at 
its discretion, allow a ballot sponsor to file briefs as amicus 
curiae on behalf of defending the law’s constitutionality.196  While 
the named defendants would still have full autonomy in deciding 
how to proceed, this would at least give further voice to the 
 
administrative law bodies, which would create an incentive for sponsors to take into 
account all important aspects of the problem, offer explanations in sync with 
evidence in the official lawmaking record, and respond in a cogent fashion to public 
comments); cf. Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1324–25 (advocating for a judicially 
reviewable requirement that legislators provide reasons for they way they vote on 
various bills, arguing that this would provide for a more well-reasoned and debated 
political process). 
192 See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1245 (arguing in favor of supermajority 
and successive-vote requirements in order to weed out narrow majorities and make 
sure the will of the public is strong); Miller, supra note 27, at 1074–78 (discussing 
single-subject rules as a way to keep the public from being manipulated or confused 
by voting for two policies at once). 
193 Indeed, the hope would be that using such criteria would create an incentive 
for ballot sponsors to adopt such reforms in order to prove that their initiative truly 
represents the will of the people. See sources cited supra note 191. 
194 Theoretically, a majority of the electorate being unhappy with their elected 
officials over such a move could either effect change on that issue through public 
debate, protests, communication with the official’s office, et cetera, or through voting 
that official out of office in favor of one who is more receptive to the type of change 
being sought. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998) (“The vast majority of theorists have failed to 
challenge [Alexander] Bickel’s basic assumption, that political accountability is the 
sine qua non of legitimacy in government action.”). 
195 If there were such limits, it would be difficult for a professional initiative 
industry to exist. See Caroline J. Tolbert et al., Election Law and Rules for Using 
Initiatives, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 20, at 27, 34–37 (discussing the professional initiative industry). 
196 See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND 
COMMENTARY 24 (2009). 
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sponsor’s concerns.197  These alternatives, while not perfect, 
provide adequate recourse for sponsors upon denial of 
intervention. 
Invariably denying intervention as of right to ballot sponsors 
accomplishes the goals of reform as effectively as any other 
proposal and is simpler to enact than other proposals.  After all, 
merely following the intended rationale of Rule 24 can create this 
reform.198  Some proposals attempt to institute new rules, placing 
procedural limitations on ballot initiatives, which would have to 
be done legislatively in each state.199  Other proposals suggest 
changing the way substantive judicial review of ballot initiatives 
is conducted, which could create constitutional issues.200  Denying 
intervention as of right to ballot sponsors would create country-
wide reform, accomplish the same goals, and could be instituted 
by merely following the rationale intended by Rule 24.201  
CONCLUSION 
As ballot initiatives continue to grow in popularity and 
criticism of the initiative process grows stronger, the issue of 
whether to allow sponsors to intervene to defend laws that they 
bring to passage has become an increasingly important one.  In 
attempting to find a solution to the circuit court split that is not 
only consistent with the history of Rule 24 but affects societal 
change as well, this Note argues that ballot sponsors should 
invariably be denied intervention as a matter of right in cases in 
which the constitutionality of the passed law is challenged.  This 
plan would incentivize ballot sponsors to be more truthful with 
the public, swing the balance of power from special interests  
back to the legislature, and ensure that recognizing the true will 
of the people is the first priority.  Furthermore, this could be 
 
197 See Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005) (describing the ways in which amicus briefs can aid the court’s 
understanding of the litigation). 
198 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
199 See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1230–34. Some would even need to be 
effected, ironically, through other ballot initiatives. See id. at 1247. 
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accomplished with little cost to the legal community, as it merely 
involves following the most rational interpretation of Rule 24.   
Consider again the case of Proposition 8 in California.  If the 
Ninth Circuit denied intervention as prescribed in this Note, 
Governor Schwarzenegger and other named defendants would 
have had the power to decide whether the passed law banning 
gay marriage would be defended.  The named defendants would 
have been forced to consider the true will of the people before 
deciding whether and how vigorously to defend the suit.  The 
looming specter of such a decision would have forced the ballot 
sponsors to engage in more honest and robust public debate on 
the issue and would have perhaps reduced it to a vote based less 
on fear and prejudice.  In the end, the result may or may not 
have ended up the same, with a strongly defended lawsuit in the 
hands of the federal courts, but the “second-check” forced by the 
upholding of Rule 24’s principles would make for a more 
democratic means and a more educated, informed, and 
empowered electorate. 
 
